沃伦.巴菲特名言（英语版2）

“Much success can be attributed to inactivity. Most investors cannot resist the temptation to constantly buy and sell.”

“When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a poor reputation for fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that stays intact.”
　　“I will tell you how to become rich. Close the doors. Be fearful when others are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.”
――Warren Buffett lecturing to a group of students at Columbia U

“There are all kinds of businesses that Charlie and I don't understand, but that doesn't cause us to stay up at night. It just means we go on to the next one, and that's what the individual investor should do.”

――Warren Buffett in a Morningstar Interview
　 “If you're an investor, you're looking on what the asset is going to do, if you're a speculator, you're commonly focusing on what the price of the object is going to do, and that's not our game.”
――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
“It is our job to help our clients be fearful when others are greedy, and look at opportunities when others are fearful.”
　 “If you understood a business perfectly and the future of the business, you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable the business is, assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger margin of safety you'd need. If you're driving a truck across a bridge that says it holds 10,000 pounds and you've got a 9,800 pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches above the crevice it covers, you may feel okay, but if it's over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety...”
――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“You pay a high price for a cheery consensus.” “If you understood a business perfectly and the future of the business, you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable the business is, assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger margin of safety you'd need. If you're driving a truck across a bridge that says it holds 10,000 pounds and you've got a 9,800 pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches above the crevice it covers, you may feel okay, but if it's over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety...”
――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“The only way to be loved is to be loveable, which really irritates me.”
―― Warren Buffett speaking at the City Club in Seattle (July 21, 2001)
　“When they open that envelope, the first instruction is to take my pulse again.”

――2001 Annual Meeting after mentioning that the instructions of his succession are sealed in an envelope at headquarters
“Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically.

Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that - only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year.”
　 “The fact that people will be full of greed, fear or folly is predictable. The sequence is not predictable.”

――Warren Buffett, Financial Review, 1985
　 “I am out of step with present conditions. When the game is no longer played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, and so on. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand ( although I find it difficult to apply ) even though it may mean foregoing large, and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don't fully understand, have not practiced successfully, and which possibly could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.”
――Warren Buffett in a letter to his partners in the stock market frenzy of 1969.
　 “We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children.”
　“The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage.”
――July 1999 at Herb Allen's Sun Valley, Idaho Retreat
　 “The most common cause of low prices is pessimism-some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.”
　 I don't read economic forecasts. I don't read the funny papers.
　 The stock market is a no-called-strike game. You don't have to swing at everything--you can wait for your pitch. The problem when you're a money manager is that your fans keep yelling， 'Swing, you bum!'
――1999 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
　 Success in investing doesn't correlate with I.Q. once you're above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.
――BusinessWeek Interview June 25 1999
　 Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire's capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can't).

我们未来的成长率将远不及过去所创造的水准，Berkshire现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事业务员的工作，而不是去教数学(请永远记住，世界上只有三种人，一种会算术，另一种不会算术)。
――1998 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders
　　There are all kinds of businesses that Charlie and I don't understand, but that doesn't cause us to stay up at night. It just means we go on to the next one, and that's what the individual investor should do.
――Warren Buffett in a Morningstar Interview
　 “Investors making purchases in an overheated market need to recognize that it may often take an extended period for the value of even an outstanding company to catch up with the price they paid.”
――Berkshire Hathaway 1998 Annual Meeting
　“We don't get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we'll wait, we'll wait indefinitely.”
――Berkshire Hathaway 1998 Annual Meeting
　　Time is the enemy of the poor business and the friend of the great business. If you have a business that's earning 20%-25% on equity, time is your friend. But time is your enemy if your money is in a low return business.
――1998 Berkshire Annual Meeting
If you expect to be a net saver during the next 5 years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall.This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.

假设你预估未来五年内可以存一笔钱，那么你希望这期间的股票市场是涨还是跌? 这时许多投资人对于这个问题的答案就可能是错的，虽然他们在未来的期间内会陆续买进股票，不过当股价涨时他们会感到高兴，股价跌时反而觉得沮丧，这种感觉不等于是当你去买汉堡吃时，看到汉堡涨价却欣喜若狂，这样的反应实在是没有什么道理，只有在短期间准备卖股票的人才应该感到高兴，准备买股票的人应该期待的是股价的下滑。
――1997 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders
　 “The strategy (of portfolio concentration ) we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it.”

我们采取的这种策略排除了依照普通分散风险的教条，许多学者便会言之凿凿说我们这种策略比起一般传统的投资风险要高的许多，这点我们不敢苟同，我们相信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。

――1993 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

“In 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of net funds available in equities - at full prices they couldn't buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.”　


　 “We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as 'the possibility of loss or injury.'”

我们相信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。
――1993 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders
　　“We think diversification, as practiced generally, makes very little sense for anyone who knows what they're doing. Diversification serves as protection against ignorance. If you want to make sure that nothing bad happens to you relative to the market, you should own everything. There's nothing wrong with that. It's a perfectly sound approach for somebody who doesn't know how to analyze businesses.
　 “But if you know how to value businesses,it's crazy to own 50 stocks or 40 stocks or 30 stocks, probably because there aren't that many wonderful businesses understandable to a single human being in all likelihood. To forego buying more of some super-wonderful business and instead put your money into 30 or 35 on your list of attractiveness just strikes Charlie and me as madness.”
――1996 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

“The most important thing in terms of your circle of competence is not how large the area of it is, but how well you've defined the perimeter. If you know where the edges are, you're way better off than somebody that's got one that's five times as large but they get very fu about the edges.”
――“Warren Buffett Talks Business,” The University of North Carolina, Center for Public Television, Chapel Hill, 1995
“Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.” “Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards - so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.”
――1996 Shareholders Letter
　　“Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts.”

我们的政策是集中持股(Concentrate Holdings)。当我们决定了后便买进「一大笔」，而非这也买一点、那也买点，但事后却漠不关心。

――1978 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

“I put a heavy weight on certainty. If you do that, the whole idea of a risk factor doesn't make sense to me. Risk comes from not knowing what you're doing.”
――“Buffett Talks Strategy with Students”, Omaha World-Herald 1994

　“I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful of a great one.” “Success in investing doesn't correlate with I.Q. once you're above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.”
　“I made a study back when I ran an investment partnership of all our larger investments versus the smaller investments. The larger investments always did better than the smaller investments. There is a threshold of examination and criticism and knowledge that has to be overcome or reached in making a big decision that you can get sloppy about on small decisions. Somebody says 'I bought a hundred shares of this or that because I heard about it at a party the other night.' Well there is that tendency with small decisions to think you can do it for not very good reasons.”
――“Warren Buffett Talks Business,” The University of North Carolina，Center for Public Television, Chapel Hill, 1995

“In our opinion,the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will,over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful...”

　“Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8 % and 17.4 %. But, surprise – none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham’s investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of the unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehen sions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist. A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.”
――Warren E. Buffett, March 7,1995

　“Can you really explain to a fish what it's like to walk on land? One day on land is worth a thousand years of talking about it. And one day running a business has exactly the same kind of value.”
――Warren E. Buffett quoted in Fortune, April 11, 1988

　“If you're an investor, you're looking on what the asset is going to do, if you're a speculator, you're commonly focusing on what the price of the object is going to do, and that's not our game.”
――1997 Berkshire Annual Meeting 

  “We don't get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we'll wait, we'll wait indefinitely。”
――1998 Berkshire Annual Meeting

“We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.”
　 “View Mr. Market as having a disorder and being in a manic depressive state and take advantage of this state of disorder."

――Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Owners Manual